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Abstract
Artemov’s Logic of Proof, LP, is an explicit proof counterpart of S4.
Their formal connection is built through the realization theorem, that
every S4 theorem can be converted to an LP theorem by substituting
proof terms for provability modals. Instead of the realization of theo-
rems, what is concerned in this paper is the realization of proofs. We
will show that only a subclass of S4 proofs, called non-circular proofs,
can be realized as LP proofs in this way. Furthermore, we introduce a
numerical version of LP, called S4∆, to constructively prove that ev-
ery S4 theorem has a non-circular proof. These results provide a new
algorithmic proof of the realization theorem.
1 Introduction
Providing an arithmetic foundation to the intuitionistic logic is a long stand-
ing problem, which Go¨del ([14]) took a first step to solve by embedding the
intuitionistic logic into a calculus of provability known as S4, and was even-
tually solved by Artemov with his Logic of Proofs, LP ([1, 2]). LP includes
formulas of the type t :F , read as “t is a proof of F,” to represent explicit
proofs in formal arithmetic with t called proof terms or proof polynomials.
This idea was also suggested by Go¨del ([13]) but unpublished until appearing
in [8]. In [1, 2] an intended arithmetic interpretation of proof terms is given
together with a completeness result. Finally, the realization theorem shows
that every S4 theorem can be converted to an LP theorem by substituing
proof terms for provability modal occurrences. This completes the project.
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Rencently, LP and other LP-style logics have joined the family of epistemic
logics to be Justifcation Logics, where formulas t : F are re-understood as
“t is a justfication of F”, and semantics based on the reading has been
built. Accordingly, the validity of the realization theorem shows that there
is justification structure inherent in S4 and other normal modal logics, which
have long been considered as standard epistemic logics (cf. [12], [11], [3],
[4]).
The realization theorem connects logics LP and S4 by theorems, but it
also suggests a deeper connection between proofs in the two logics. As
we can see that the axioms and inference rules in the standard S4 system
and LP are almost entirely corresponding to each other, we can consider –
once we make variations on the sytems – such a concept of proof realization
which demands that the substitution of proof terms for modals produces
an axiom to axiom and derived line to derived line correspondence beteeen
proofs. Then we discover, despite the parallelism of the two systems and the
validity of the realization theorem, that not every S4 proof can be converted
to an LP proof. Some kind of non-circularity among modals is essential to
have realizable proofs. In the paper the definiton of non-circular proofs will
be given based on examining interrelations between formula occurrences in
proofs. One of our goal is to provide an algorithm to realize these proofs.
Once the realizability of non-circular S4 proofs is established, here the
burden of realizing an S4 theorem can be shifted to find a non-circular proof
of the theorem. The natural next move would be to find an algorithm to
directly turn a circular proof into a non-circular one. But unfortunately
we couldn’t provide such an algorithm, and the reason is familiar: there’s
no such tool in Hilbert style proof systems as cut-elimination in Genzten
systems or normalization in Natural Deduction. So instead, we consider
converting cut-free Gentzen style proofs to S4 proofs, and prove the latter’s
non-circularity.
To accomplish the above goals, we find a logical system, S4∆. In the sys-
tem, every formula prefixed by a box is accompanied with a number label,
and non-propositional axiom schemes are those from S4 joined with condi-
tions set on the numbers involved in the schemes. The non-circularity of S4
proofs implies a linear order on modals, and this leads to the introduction
of S4∆. We will show that non-circular S4 proofs are equal to S4∆ proofs
regardless of number labels, and then realize S4∆ proofs as LP-style proofs.
We also find a ∆-style cut-free Gentzen system which is just the cut-
free Gentzen system for S4 joined with numerical conditions set for modal
rules such that these ∆-modal rules are sound with respect to S4∆. It
is shown that every proof in the Gentzen system is a proof in its ∆-style
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counterpart regardless of number labels. This result plus the soundness of
the ∆-style Gentzen system implies that every S4 theorem can be realized to
an S4∆ theorem and hence has a non-circular proof. Then, we also provide
algorithms to convert proofs in S4∆ to proofs in its variants, to find the right
proofs whose realizations are exactly LP proofs.
Our concepts of non-circular proofs and proof realization can be adapted
to other normal modal logics with their LP-style couterparts, and the real-
ization procedure provided here can be extended to these logics with their
cut-free Gentzen system. All we need is to provide the right numerical con-
ditions set for modal rules. In the end of the paper, as examples, we will
particularly discuss the normal modal logics GL, and S5, which has a peculiar
cut-free Gentzen system introduced by Fitting [10, 9].
The plan of this paper is as follows. Systems including S4, LP and their
variants are presented later in this section, and the concept of non-circular
proofs in S4 and its variants is defined in the next section. In Section 3,
the logical system S4∆ and its variants, S4′∆ and S4′′∆, are introduced.
We prove that non-circular proofs are proofs in these systems regardless
of number labels, and provide realizations of proofs in these systems. In
Section 4, a complete (theorem) realization procedure is given. There are
three subsetions. The first is an algorithm to convert a cut-free S4 proof to
an S4∆ proof. The second offers an algorithm to convert an S4∆ proof to an
S4′∆ proof. Here the relationship between the inference rules necessitaion,
and axiom necessitation is the issue. In the third subsection, we provide
an algorithm to produce S4′′∆ proofs whose proof realizations are exacly LP
proofs, where the function of “+” operator will play a role. In Section 5,
the realization procedure for other loigcs will be discussed.
Preliminaries
The languages present in this paper will all be extensions of the propositional
language. The propositional language used here is built from a set of propo-
sitional variables P and the full set of boolean connectives: {¬,∨,∧,→}.
The language L! for S4 and its variants has the non-propositional formula
formation rule: if F ∈ L!, (!F ) ∈ L!. Parentheses will be omitted in the
conventional way.
Definition 1.1 (S4).
Axiom Schemes:
A0 axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
A1 !(F → G) → !F → !G
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A2 !F → !!F
A3 !F → F
Inference rules
R1 F, F → G % G “modus ponens”
R2 % !F , if % F “necessitation”
The axiom scheme A0 is actually a set of schemes. Any complete classical
propositional axiom schemes can be A0. We are going to see several Hilbert
style systems in this paper. All their A0 axiom scheme (or schemes) are
presupposed to be the same. Any one axiom scheme other than A0 will be
called a modal axiom scheme. When we need to specify in which system the
axiom or the inference rule is, such as A0 in S4, we write S4A0 instead.
The set of proof terms Tm contains a set C of proof constants and a
set X of proof variables. For any s, t in Tm, (s · t), (s + t), (!t) are also
in Tm, where ·, +, and ! are functional symbols for combining terms. The
non-propositional formula formation rule for the language L: of LP and its
variants is: if F ∈ L: then t :F ∈ L: for any t ∈ Tm.
Definition 1.2 (Logic of Proofs, LP).
Axiom Schemes:
A0 axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
A1 s : (F → G) → t :F → (s · t) :G
A2 s :F →!s :s :F
A3 s :F → F
A4 s :F → (s + t) :F , s :F → (t + s) :F
Inference rules:
R1 F, F → G % G “modus ponens”
R2 % c :F for c ∈ C, if % F and F is an axiom
“axiom necessitation”
This system is what was originally introduced in [2], but for the elegance
of the correspondence between proofs, our discussion won’t be directly about
this system until dealing with the realization theorem. Instead, we adopt the
following extended version of LP. (Below o(s) and o˙(s) both denote proof
terms with s as their summand, where o(s) can be equal to s while o˙(s)
can’t.)
Definition 1.3 (ELP).
Axiom Schemes:
A0 axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
A1 s : (F → G) → t :F → o(s · t) :G
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A2 s :F → o(!s) :s :F
A3 s :F → F
A4 s :F → o˙(s) :F
Inference rules:
R1 F, F → G % G “modus ponens”
R2 % o(c) :F for c ∈ C, if % F and F is an axiom
“axiom necessitation”
Two more variants of LP are ELP−, which is ELP with the axiom ELPA4
being removed, and GELP−, which is ELP− with the axiom necessitation
replaced by the necessitation “% o(c) : F for c ∈ C, if % F” as its R2 rule.
Note that these logics are not equivalent. That the permitted set of formulas
applied by the (axiom) necessitation rule are different makes the difference.
However every S4 theorem has a realization counterpart in each of these
variants.
On the other side we have equivalent S4 systems, S4, S4′, and S4′′. S4′
is S4 with the the necessitation replaced by axiom necessitation, “% !F , if
% F , and F is an axiom,” as its R2 rule . S4′′ is S4′ with the axiom S4′′A4,
!F → !F , being added. Algorithms to convert S4 proofs to S4′ proofs
are implicit in the proof of Proposition 4.10. The axiom S4′′A4 is an S4′
theorem, and this makes S4′ and S4′′ equivalent.
Comparisons will be made only between proofs in systems whose axioms
and inference rules correspond to each other. That is, we will consider proof
realization between S4 and GELP−, between S4′ and ELP−, and between S4′′
and ELP.
In this paper we need to deal with formula occurrences. They are for-
mulas with their positions in another formula, or a sequence of formulas. In
the following definition, we will take a path x of the parse tree of a formula
F to denote the position, occurrence, of a subformula occurrence in F , and
F (x) to be the subformula at the occurrence. ◦ denotes a connective.
Definition 1.4 (occurrence).
Let F be a formula in L!. We define the set O(F ) of the occurrences and
the function, also denoted as F , which maps an occurrence to the subformula
of F at the occurrence simultaneously. Let " be the empty sequence.
1. " ∈ O(F ) and F (") = F ,
2. If x ∈ O(F ) and F (x) = (G◦H), then x.a, x.b ∈ O(F ) and F (x.a) = G,
and F (x.b) = H,
3. if x ∈ O(F ) and F (x) = (◦G), then x.# ∈ O(F ) and F (x.#) = G,
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4. Furthermore, we extend the defintion on formulas to sequences of for-
mulas in L!, such as proofs. Let F be the n-th element of a sequence
D, then n ∈ O(D) and D(n) = F .
In occurreces a, b denotes the left and right operand of binary operators
and # the operand of unary operators. Here’s some facts about the notation
of occurrences.
1. ".x ≡ x ≡ x.",
2. if x ∈ O(D) and y ∈ O(D(x)), then x.y ∈ O(D), andD(x.y) = D(x)(y),
3. if E is a substitutional instance of D then O(D) ⊆ O(E)
4. {D(x) | x ∈ O(D) } is the set of subformulas of D,
We use m-formula to name all the formulas built from the non-propositional
rules, i.e. !F and t : F are m-formulas. m(D) is the set of occurrences of
m-formulas in D.
2 Non-circular Proofs
Consider the following example. Let
φ1 ≡ !(P → Q) → !P → !Q
φ2 ≡ !(Q→ P ) → !Q→ !P
φ3 ≡ !(P → Q) → !(Q→ P ) → ((!P → !P )∧
(!Q→ !Q))
Then the sequence φ1, φ2, φ1 → φ2 → φ3, φ2 → φ3, φ3 is a proof, where
φ1 → φ2 → φ3 is a classical tautology. Given that φ1 and φ2 are axioms,
they should be realized to
φr1 ≡ s : (P → Q) → t :P → (s · t) :Q
φr2 ≡ u : (Q→ P ) → v :Q→ (u · v) :P
for some proof terms s, t, u, v. But in order to realize φ1 → φ2 → φ3 as a
classical tautology, we need v = s · t and t = u · v. Since there is no solution
to the equations, there’s no way to realize the proof. The problem in this
example comes from some kind of circularity among m-formula occurrences,
especially among m-formula occurrences in modal axioms. Our goal is to
show that all S4 proofs without circularity of this kind are realizable.
Here we need to find a way to partition formula occurrenes in a proof
such that the movements of fomulas in the proof can be reflected. We use
labels to induce partitions.
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Definition 2.1. (label function)
Given D a formula or a sequence of formulas in L!, and I a label set, we
call l : m(D) → I a label funciton on D. Any set can be a label set. Also label
function lx : m(D(x)) → I is defined as for any y ∈ m(D(x)), lx(y) = l(x.y).
Every label function l induces an equivalence relation l∼ on O(D) such
that for any x, y ∈ O(D) x l∼ y iff D(x) = D(y) and for any x.z, y.z ∈ m(D)
l(x.z) = l(y.z).
Contrary to Gentzen systems, where inference rules share some struc-
tural features, it is not obvious how to trace a formula moving in a proof
in Hilbert style, where axioms are the main body of proof systems. Here’s
the idea. The different occurrences of a propositional letter in an axiom
scheme mark the stops a formula should stay in an axiom when the proof
grows1. That is, we demand that substitutional instances of a propositional
letter’s different occurrences in an axiom scheme be equivalent. Other than
that, modal axiom schemes also may set conditions for the movements of
m-formulas. In our case, the two !F occurrences in the scheme !F → !!F
should be equivalent. Here’s the definition.
Definition 2.2 (proof label function).
A label function l on a proof D in S4, S4′ or S4′′ is a proof label function
provided:
1. if D(n) = Aρ and A(x) = A(y) ∈ P with A an axiom shceme and ρ a
propositional letter substitution, then n.x l∼ n.y,
2. if D(n) is !F → !!F , then l(n.a) = l(n.b.#), i.e. (combining the
above) n.a l∼ n.b.#,
3. if D(n) = G is derived from D(m) = F and D(k) = F → G by modus
ponens, then n l∼ k.b and m l∼ k.a,
4. if D(n) = !F is derived from D(m) = F by necessitation ( for D in
S4) or axiom necessitation (for D in S4′ or S4′′), then n.# l∼ m.
An example will help here. Given an axiom instance (!Q → !P ) →
(!Q → !P ) → (!Q → !P ) of the axiom scheme P → Q → P , there
are three formula occurrences of !P . Among these formula occurrenes,
the first and the third have to be given the same label, while there is no
restriction on the label given to the second. Actually, all the subformulas
1We don’t distinguish axiom schemes from their simpliest propositional letter substi-
tutional instances.
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within the first pair of parentheses should be considered as moving into the
third pair of parentheses since subformulas in these pairs are subformulas
of substitutional instances of the same propositional letter P of the axiom
scheme. One of the labeling of the given axiom can be explicitly expressed
as (!Qv → !Pw) → (!Qu → !P x) → (!P v → !Qw).
Definition 2.3. For any two label functions l, l′ on the same domain, we
say l′ covers l if x l
′∼ y, whenever x l∼ y for any x, y in the domain.
Lemma 2.4. If l is a proof label function on a proof D, and l′ is a label
function on D such that l′ covers l, then l′ is also a proof label function on
D.
Our definition of proof label function is liberal. There can be more
than one proof label function on a proof. But only the samllest one with
respect the covering relation completely reflects the structure of the proof.
We can constructively find a such one by following the conditions listed in
the defintion. Later we need this lemma.
Lemma 2.5. Given a proof D, and a label function l on D, if for any
x, y ∈ m(D) with x l∼ y, l′(x) = l′(y), then l′ covers l.
As our earlier observation shows, what matter here are the relations
(called a stamp) among m-formula occurrences in modal axioms. The rela-
tions defined below are suggested by LP, though all the results concerning
circularity here can be applied to those determined by any stamps of any
proof systems of any modal logics.
Definition 2.6 (the standard stamp of S4).
A stamp A of a proof system is a collection of binary relations A−→ on
m(A) with A a modal axiom scheme.
The standard stamp of S4 and S4′ include (the scheme names stand for
the schemes)
A1−−→= { 〈a, b.b〉 , 〈b.a, b.b〉 },
A2−−→= { 〈a, b〉 },
and, one more for S4′′,
A4−−→= { 〈a, b〉 }.
That is, we concern directed edges from !(F → G) to !G and from !F
to !G in the scheme !(F → G) → !F → !G, from !F to !!F in the
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scheme !F → !!F , and from the first !F to the second !F in the scheme
!F → !F .
Below [x]l denotes the equivalence class containing the occurrence x in-
duced by the label function l.
Definition 2.7. Given a proof label function l on D in a system with stamp
A, if D(n) is an axiom instance of an axiom scheme A, we will write
[n.x]l A−→ [n.y]l for x A−→ y.
We say a sequence of equivalence classes E1, E2, . . . is an A-stamping
chain, or just a stamping chain of the proof label function l if for any i,
Ei
A−→ Ei+1.
A stamping chain is circular if there are i -= j, Ei = Ej.
Definition 2.8 (non-circular proof).
A proof label function is said to be circular if one of its stamping chain
is circular; otherwise non-circular.
A proof D is non-circular if there exists a non-circular proof label func-
tion defined on D.
Before ending this section, let’s see some examples.
!(P → Q)x → !P u → !Qv
!(Q→ P )y → !Qv → !Pw
!(P → Q)x → !(Q→ P )y → !P u → !Pw
This is a proof in S4, and also in S4′ and S4′′, with some non-crucial
steps skipped, and one of the labeling of the proof defined by some proof
lable function is expressed. !(P → Q)x, !Qv, !Pw, and !P u, !Qv, !Pw
are instances of non-circular stamping chains with the labels kept to express
the equivalence classes. It’s not difficult to see that no non-circular chain
can be made in this case. If we replace the label w by the label u in our
example, the result is still a labeling defined by a proof label function, but
!P u, !Qv, !P u will be a circular stamping chain. Here’s another example.
!(P → Q)x → !P u → !Qv
!(Q→ P )w → !Qv → !P u
!(P → Q)x → !(Q→ P )x → ((!P u → !P u) ∧ (!Qv → !Qv))
A stamping chain of this labeling is !(Q→ P )x, !P u, !Qv, !P u, !Qv,
which is circular. And it can be checked that every proof label function
defined on this proof has a circular stamping chain.
9
3 S4∆ and Non-circular Proof Realization
3.1 S4∆
Two things lead us to find S4∆. One is that the non-circularity can be
detected by number labels. The other is that instead of directly dealing
with m-formula occurrences, it will be easier to work on formulas but with
their labels built in. We’ll begin with the preliminary work.
Definition 3.1 (increasing proof label function).
A proof label function ∆ : m(D) → N on a proof D in S4, S4′, or S4′′ is
increasing if ∆(n.x) < ∆(n.y), for any substitutional instance D(n) of an
axiom scheme A, and any occurrences x A−→ y.
Lemma 3.2. ∆ is an increasing proof label function on a proof D, if and
only if for any x, y ∈ O(D), if [x]∆ A−→ [y]∆, then ∆(x) < ∆(y).
Proof. By the definitions of increasing proof label function and the fact that
if w ∆∼ z, then ∆(w) = ∆(z). .
Proposition 3.3. A proof D is non-circular if and only if there exists an
increasing label function ∆ on D.
Proof. When ∆ is increasing, by the lemma, the stamping chains of ∆ can’t
be circular. Hence every increasing proof label function is non-circular.
For the other direction, when D is non-circular, there exists a proof label
function l on D such that stamping chains of l is non-circular. Based on
l, we can define a function ∆0 : m(D) → N such that ∆0(x) = max{k |
[x]l is the k-th element of a stamping chain of l}. Since for any x ∆∼ y in
m(D), ∆0(x) = ∆0(y), ∆0 covers l; ∆0 is a proof label function. Also
since for [x]l A−→ [y]l, ∆0(x) < ∆0(y), ∆0 is increasing. This completes the
proof. .
Based on ∆0, other increasing proof label function ∆ covering l can be
built.
Definition 3.4. An equivalence class [x]l in the proof is said to be initial if
there’s no [y]l such that [y]l A−→ [x]l.
Corollary 3.5. Given a proof D and its proof label function l, let S be the
set of initial equivalence classes and f : S → N. There exists an increasing
proof label function ∆ covering l such that for any [x]l ∈ S, ∆(x) = f([x]l).
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Proof. Let m = max{f([x]l) | [x]l ∈ S}, and ∆0 be the function built by
the construction in the above proposition. Then the numerical function
∆ such that for any x ∈ m(D), ∆(x) = f([x]l) if [x]l is initial, otherwise
∆(x) = ∆0(x) + m will do the job. .
Let I be a label set. The language LI is an extended propositional
language with the non-propositional formula formation rule: if F ∈ LI and
u ∈ I, (!F u) ∈ LI. We will call the label u in !F u the principal label of
the formula, denoted as ν(!F u). !F u is an m-formula.
Our Definition 1.4 can be well-adapted to define formula ocurrences of
formulas or sequences of formulas in LI for any label set I with the following
clause about m-formulas: if x ∈ O(F ) and F (x) = (!Gu), then x.# ∈ O(F )
and F (x.#) = G.
Several translations defined on formula occurrences will be given in the
rest of the paper. They will all fix the propositional letter occurrences and
commute with boolean connectives. Let D be a sequence of formulas in L!,
F a sequence of formulas in LI.
Definition 3.6.
For every label function l : m(D) → I, there is an induced translation, also
denoted by l, such that for any x ∈ O(D), Dl(x) = !Dlx.!(x.#)u where
u = l(x).
A !-translation on F is a translation such that for every x ∈ m(F), F!(x) =
!F!(x.#),
lF is a label function on F! induced by F such that for every x ∈ m(F!),
lF (x) = ν(F(x)).
The lF is well-defined since x ∈ m(F!) if and only if x ∈ m(F).
Lemma 3.7. For x, y ∈ O(D), x l∼ y iff Dl(x) = Dl(y).
Proposition 3.8. F = Dl iff F! = D and lF = l.
The language of S4∆ and its variants are L∆, which is an LI with natural
numbers as labels.
Definition 3.9 (S4∆).
Axiom Schemes:
A0 axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
A1 !(F → G)i → !F j → !Gk, i, j < k
A2 !F i → !(!F i)j, i < j
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A3 !F i → F
Inference rules
R1 F, F → G % G ”modus ponens”
R2 % !F i for any i, if % F ”necessitation”
S4′∆ is S4∆ with the necessitation replaced by the axiom necessitation, “%
!F i for any i, if % F and F is an axiom,”, and S4′′∆ is S4∆ with axiom
S4′′∆A4, !F i → !F j , i < j, being added
Next is the main theorem of this subsection.
Theorem 3.10. A proof D in S4, S4′, or S4′′ is non-circular if and only
if there is a proof label function ∆ : m(D) → N such that D∆ is a proof in
S4∆, S4′∆, or S4′′∆, respectively.
Proof. When D∆ = F is a proof in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆], it is not difficult to
check that D (= F!) is a proof in S4 [S4′, S4′′], and ∆ (= lF ) is a proof
label function on D. As to ∆’s being increasing it is exactly because of our
conditions set on the modal axiom schemes of the system. So D is non-
circular. For the other direction when D is a non-circular proof, there is,
by Proposition 3.3, an increasing proof label function, say ∆, on D. Then
we only need to show D∆ is a proof in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆]. Since ∆ is a
proof label function, when A is an axiom, by Lemma 3.7, A∆ will still be an
axiom, except that we have to check that those conditions we set on modal
axiom schemes are fulfilled. And this is the case because ∆ is increasing.
Furthermore, when φ is derived from previous lines of the proof, it is routine
to check that φ∆ is still a derived line in D∆ by the same inference rule. .
3.2 Non-circular Proof Realization
Definition 3.11 (proof assignment).
Given a sequence F of formulas in L∆, a proof assignment p on F assigns
each pair (F, i) to a subformula !F i in F a proof term.
Each proof assignment p induces a translation on F to a sequence of L:
formulas such that (!F i)p = p(F, i) : (F p)
Here’s a characterization of m-formulas in a proof.
Definition 3.12. Given a proof in an S4∆ system,
1. if axiom !(F → G)i → !F j → !Gk is in the proof, we say !Gk is
an A1-formula, and < !(F → G)i,!F j > is a predecessor pair of !Gk
with !(F → G)i the α-predecessor and !F j the β-predecessor of !Gk.
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2. if an axiom !F i → !(!F i)j is in the proof, we say !(!F i)j is an
A2-formula, and !F j is a γ-predecessor of !(!F i)j;
3. if an axiom !F i → !F j is in the proof, we say !F j is an A4-formula
and !F i is a δ-predecessor of !F j;
4. if !F i is derived from necessitation (in an S4∆ proof), or from axiom
necessitation (in an S4′∆ proof or an S4′′∆ proof), we say !F i is an
R2-formula .
An m-formula can fall into more than one of those categories. If a for-
mula is at most in one of the above categories we say the formula is stable.
Especially when the formula is, say, only an A1-formula or in none of the
above categories, we will say the formula is A1-stable. We will need this
definition in the Subsection 4.3.
Definition 3.13 (characteristic proof assignment).
Each proof F in S4∆, S4′∆, or S4′′∆ will be associated with a system
of equations EF for an unknow proof assignment p. The system consists
of:
1. p(F, i) = o(p(G, j) · p(H, k)) when < !Gj ,!Hk > is a predecessor pair
of !F i,
2. p(F, i) = o(!p(G, j)) when !Gj is a γ-predecessor of !F i,
3. p(F, i) = o˙(p(G, j)) when !Gj is a δ-predecessor of !F i,
4. p(F, i) = o(c), for some c ∈ C, when !F i is an R2-formula. In partic-
ular, we request different constants for different equations.
A characteristic proof assignment of a proof F in S4∆, S4′∆, or S4′′∆ is a
proof assignment which satisfies all the equations in EF .
Lemma 3.14. Each proof F in S4∆, S4′∆, or S4′′∆ has a characteristic
proof assignment.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the principal labels of m-formulas
in F . In the base case, for m-formulas !F i with i the smallest principal
label of m-formulas in F , if they are derived from (axiom) necessitation, we
assign pairs (F, i) the proof constants c they need to have; otherwise they
are assigned arbitrary terms. Especially, we assign different variables for
different pairs.
At the induction step, suppose we want to determine the proof assign-
ment value of !F i, namely p(F, i). By induction hypothesis, the proof
assignment values of the predecessors of !F i have been constructed, since
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their principal labels are smaller than i. When !F i has no predecessor,
assign a new proof variable to p(F, i). If !F i has only one predecessor !Gj
which is a δ-predecessor with p(G, j) = s, let p(F, i) = s+ t for a term t. In
other cases, let S be the set of proof terms built up from the proof assignment
value of the predecessors of !F i. That is, S contains s · t if < !Gj ,!Hk >
is a predecessor pair of !F i with p(G, j) = s and p(H, k) = t, !s if !Gj is a
γ-predecessor with p(G, j) = s, s if !Gj is an δ-predecessor with p(G, j) = s,
and constant c if p(F, i) = o(c) is in EF . Let p(F, i) =
∑
s∈S s. Then p is a
characteristic proof assignment. .
Theorem 3.15. H is a proof in GELP− [ELP−, ELP] if and only if there is a
proof F in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆] and a characteristic proof assignment p on F
such that H = Fp.
Proof. Given a proof F in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆] and a characteristic proof as-
signment p on F , it’s not hard to check that H = Fp is a proof in GELP−
[ELP−, ELP]. For the other direction, let Tm(H) be the set of proof terms
in H, and η : Tm(H) → N be an injective function linearizing the subterm
relation on Tm(H). Then there is a translation on H induced by η such
that (t :F )η = !(F η)η(t). Then F = Hη is a proof in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆]. Now
take the proof assignment p such that for any !F i in F , p(F, i) = η−1(i). p
will satisfy all the equations in EF , and Fp will be H. .
Theorem 3.16. A proof D in S4 [S4′, S4′′] is non-circular if and only if
there exists a realization r such that Dr is a proof in GELP− [ELP−, ELP].
Proof. To realize a non-circular proof D in S4 [S4′, S4′′], by Theorem 3.10,
there is a ∆ such that D∆ is a proof in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆], and, by the theorem
above, there is a p such that (D∆)p is a proof in GELP− [ELP−, ELP]. Take
r = p ◦ ∆. Then the translation induced from this r is the one we want.
For the other direction, let H = Dr be a proof in GELP− [ELP−, ELP]. Then
H = Fp for some proof F in S4∆ [S4′∆, S4′′∆] and some proof assignment
p. It can be checked that D = F!. D is a non-circular proof.
In fact, for this direction, we can directly prove it from H. If we disre-
gard the superficial symbolic difference, language L: is one of labeled modal
language LI with proof terms as labels. Then D = H! and lH = r. However
r will be a non-circular proof label function on D because of the conditions
of proof terms set on modal axiom schemes. .
When trying to prove the realization theorem by induction on a Hilbert
style proof, researchers find difficulty in dealing with modus ponens that if
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theorems F and F → G are realizable, meaning there are theorems F r1 and
(F → G)r2 in an LP-style logic, it is hard to unify the realizations r1 and r2
as one realization. Here we provide an explanation. Suppose for theorems
F r1 and (F → G)r2 , we have their proofs Dr1 and D′r2 where the under-
lying sequences D and D′ are non-circular. Now though the concatenation
sequence DD′G is a proof of G, it doesn’t have to be non-circular. Hence
there is no immediate r such that (DD′G)r is a proof. As a result, the
difficulty to find an unified realization r of F and F → G is the same as
the difficulty to find an algorithm to directly convert a circular proof to a
non-circular one.
Our research also show that not all proofs but only non-circular proofs
are coded by proof terms. This is different from the cases for λ-calculus
(Natural Deduction) and combinatory logic (Hilbert style proofs), where
every intuitionistic proof is represented. We can say LP (and so is S4∆)
is a study of non-circular proofs, where substitutive proof terms code the
interstructure of the proofs. While one LP proof has more information than
the other, only the smallest one with respect to the covering relation has
the full strutural information of its underlying non-circular proof. But if the
complexity is taken into account, it is possible that for an S4 theorem φ, in
any of its realization there is a proof term whose length is far more longer
than the length of φ’s shortest proof. Of course, this statement needs more
reasearches on non-circular proofs to confirm.
The following are some further features of our proof realization algo-
rithm.
Remark 1. Normal realization is the kind of theorem realization which de-
mands that different negative m-formula occurrences be realized by different
proof variables. In our proof realization procedure, if in a ∆-style proof ev-
ery negative formula has only one occurrence in the conclusion and is intial,
i.e. having no predecessors, then the conclusion can be normally realized.
Let’s call proofs of this kind normal. Then it is not difficult to check ∆-style
proofs produced in the next section, with some number label adjustments,
will be normal, and hence our theorem realization procedure can produce
normal realization.
Remark 2. An alternative to the axiom necessitation is that a formula c :A
with a constant c ∈ C and an axioms A can be derived only if it is in a
Constant Specification set. In this case, we just have to delay the providing
of specific proof constants until the end of the proof realization algorithm.
Remark 3. For two ∆-style proofs D∆ and D∆′ , though they have the same
underlying sequence, their proof realizations can be different. Especially,
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when ∆′ covers ∆, the proof realzation result of D∆′ can have longer proof
terms. So if the complexity is the issue, the smallest ∆ on D with respect
to the covering relation should be taken.
4 A (Thereom) Realization Procedure
In the first subsection, we show that every S4 theorem can be realized to an
S4∆ theorem by examining the theorem’s cut-free proof. In the second, we
show how to produce an S4′∆ proof from an S4∆ proof. Finally, from an S4′∆
proof, we create an S4′′∆ proofs of a type, called stable, whose realization
will be an LP proof.
4.1 From S4 to S4∆
A sequent Γ ⇒ Γ′ is a pair of finite multisets Γ, Γ′ of formulas. It is
convenient for us to view a sequenct as a formula C1 → (. . . → (Cn →∨
Γ′) . . .). Given a multiset Γ = {Ci} of formulas in L!, !Γ = {!Ci}. Given
a multiset Γ = {Ci} of formulas in L∆, !Γι = {!Cjii }, for ji a number
in the multiset ι. |Γ| is the number of formulas in Γ. Here’s the Gentzen
systems2.
Definition 4.1 (S4G−).
The only axiom is that P ⇒ P , for a propositional letter P .
The rules for weakening (W) and constraction (C)
LW Γ⇒ Γ
′
A,Γ⇒ Γ′ RW
Γ⇒ Γ′
Γ⇒ Γ′, A
LC A,A,Γ⇒ Γ
′
A,Γ⇒ Γ′ RC
Γ⇒ Γ′, A,A
Γ⇒ Γ′, A
The classical logical rules (i=0,1):
L¬ Γ⇒ Γ
′, A
¬A,Γ⇒ Γ′ R¬
Γ, A⇒ Γ′
Γ⇒ Γ′,¬A
L∧ Ai,Γ⇒ Γ
′
A0 ∧A1,Γ⇒ Γ′
R∧ Γ⇒ Γ
′, A Γ⇒ Γ′, B
Γ⇒ Γ′, A ∧B
L∨ A,Γ⇒ Γ
′ B,Γ⇒ Γ′
A ∨B,Γ⇒ Γ′ R∨
Γ⇒ Γ′, Ai
Γ⇒ Γ′, A0 ∨A1
L→ Γ⇒ Γ
′, A B,Γ⇒ Γ′
A→ B,Γ⇒ Γ′ R→
A,Γ⇒ Γ′, B
Γ⇒ Γ′, A→ B
2Our system S4G− is similar to the cut-free propositional fragment of G1s in [18] but
for language with only one modal operator !, and with the negation ¬ connective instead
of the falsehood ⊥.
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The modal rules are
L! A,Γ⇒ Γ
′
!A,Γ⇒ Γ′ R!
!Γ⇒ A
!Γ⇒ !A
Definition 4.2 (S4∆G−).
S4∆G− is a system on formulas in L∆. It is just the S4G− with the
following ∆-modal rules
L! A,Γ⇒ Γ
′
!Ai,Γ⇒ Γ′ , for any i
R! !Γ
ι ⇒ A
!Γι ⇒ !Ai , for any i > max(ι) + |Γ| + 1, when |Γ| &= 0, and
for any i when |Γ| = 0
In the following, when we adjust m-formula occurrences’ number labels,
we adjust all the related fomulas of premises and conclusions of rules to the
same number. Recall that cut-free proofs respect the polarity of formulas.
Lemma 4.3. If in an S4∆G− proof we adjust the number labels such that
the principal labels of negative m-formula occurrences become smaller, and
those of positive m-formula occurrences become larger, the result will still be
an S4∆G− proof.
Proof. The only apllications of inference rule will be affected by this adjust-
ment are the applications of the right ∆-modal rule . However, the condition
set on the rule certainly is still fulfilled after the adjustment. .
Proposition 4.4. Every S4G− proof is a proof of S4∆G− without number
labels.
Proof. The proof is quite staightforward. We can give suitable labels to an
S4G− proof by induction on the depth of the prooftree. There are some
cases, like applications of two-premise inference rules, in which the labels
need adjustments. In these cases, we can apply the previous lemma to have
adequate labels. Nevertheless, the most efficient method is to let all negative
formula occurrences have label 0, and all positive formula occurrences have
label equal to the nubmer of m-formula occurrecs in the S4G− proof. Then
the condition for the right ∆-modal rule will be satisfied. But notice that
this efficient method won’t work when the∆-modal rule have conditions such
that the priniciple label of a positive m-formula relys on principal labels of
other positve m-formulas. .
Proposition 4.5. Every S4∆G− proof of can be converted to an S4∆ proof
with the same conclusion.
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Proof. The procedure is just to convert each application of an inference rule
(including axioms) to a sequence of formulas. Here we only have to check
there are such conversion for applications of ∆-modal rules, especially the
right ∆-modal rule. We need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.6. For |Γ| > 0 and i > max(ι, e) + |Γ| + 1, !(!Γι ⇒ A)e →
(!Γι ⇒ !Ai) is provable in S4∆.
Proof. It’s equivalent to prove that for |Θ| ≥ 0 and i > max(ι, j, e)+ |Θ|+2
(∗) !(!Cj → (!Θι ⇒ A))e → (!Cj → (!Θι ⇒ !Ai))
is provable in S4∆. We will prove this by induction on |Θ|. First let e′ >
max(e, j + 1) then
!(!Cj → (!Θι ⇒ A))e → !(!Cj)j+1 → !(!Θι ⇒ A)e′
is an A1 axiom, and
!Cj → !(!Cj)j+1 is an A2 axiom, and hence
(∗∗) !(!Cj → (!Θι ⇒ A))e → !Cj → !(!Θι ⇒ A)e′
is provable in S4∆. When Θ is empty, let e′ = i > max(e, j)+2 > max(e, j+
1), then (∗∗) holds, and hence the base case of (∗) is proved. At the induction
step suppose |Θ| = n + 1. Let e′ = max(j + 1, e) + 1 and i > max(ι, j, e) +
|Θ| + 2 and hence i > max(ι, e′) + |Θ| + 1. Then (∗∗) holds. By induction
hypothesis, !(!Θι ⇒ A)e′ → (!Θι ⇒ !Ai), which is equivalent to the
formula !(!C ′j′ → (!Θ′ι′ ⇒ A))e′ → (!C ′j → (!Θ′ι′ ⇒ !Ai)) with |Θ′| = n,
holds. Then by classical propositional logic (∗) is provable in S4∆. This
finishes the proof for the induction step. .
Since if !Γι ⇒ A is provable in S4∆, when Γ is empty, by necessitation,
⇒ !Ai is provable, and when Γ is not empty, !(!Γι ⇒ A)0 is a theorem,
and hence, by the lemma, !Γι ⇒ !Ai is provable in S4∆, whenever i >
max(ι) + |Γ|+ 1. .
Corollary 4.7. Every S4 theorem has a non-circular proof.
Proof. From all above in this subsection we can conclude that every S4
theorem φ can be realized to an S4∆ theorem φ∆. Let F be an S4∆ proof
of φ∆. Then by Theorem 3.10, F! is a non-circular proof of φ. .
4.2 From S4∆ to S4′∆
In this subsection we will convert an S4∆ proof to an S4′∆ proof. We will
provide two methods: one is called the inductive and the other is the struc-
tural. They have different purposes. We will discuss them later. Now we
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need to do some preliminary work. First, we will presuppose that in the S4∆
proof in discussion every R2-formula is initial, that is, it has no predecessors.
This is the case when the proof is coverted from an S4∆G− proof. However,
in general if an R2-formula !F i has predecessors, we can extend the proof
by adding formulas including
!F 0, F → F , !(F → F )0, !(F → F )0 → !F 0 → !F i, !F 0 → !F i,
and a proof of the tautology F → F if it is not an axiom.
Second, since now in our proof every R2-formula is initial, we can adjust
the labels in the proof such that the number labels of these initial formulas
have the numbers we want them to have, as suggested by the Corollary 3.5.
Now given an S4∆ proof, before we extend the proof to an S4′∆ proof, we
will first modify the number label of an R2-formulas derive from the n-th
element of the proof to be an+1 for some constant a in the inductive method,
and to n in the structural method. We first see the inductive method.
Lemma 4.8. For any S4′∆ proof F , there is an S4′∆ proof F ′ such that if
φ is the k-th element of F , then !φka is the i-th element of F ′, where a is
a constant and i at most ka.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of F . The axiom case and
the modus ponens case are trivial. We consider the application of axiom
necessitation. Suppose the k-th !Ai is derived from axiom A, and i < ka,
then add !Ai → !(!Ai)ka, !(!Ai)ka to the proof. If i ≥ ka, then it can
be checked that there is a number e independent of the choice of i such that
!(!A0 → !Ai)e and !(!A0)1 is provable in S4′∆, then pick a large enough
such that !(!Ai)ka can be derived by adding at most a formulas. .
Proposition 4.9. (inductive method) Every proof in S4∆ can be extended
to a proof in S4′∆.
Proof. Here we use the term extend in a broad sense that before amplifying
the proof, adjustments on the numbers are allowed. We will show that if
φ has S4∆ proof of length n then φ has an S4′∆ proof of length at most
an+1. We only check the case of application of necessitation. If !F an+1 in
a proof is derive from F which is the n-th element in the proof of φ, then
by induction hypothesis, F has a S4′∆ proof of length an, and by the above
lemma, !F an+1 has an S4′∆ proof of length at most a(n+1). .
Proposition 4.10. (structural method) Every proof in S4∆ can be extended
to a proof in S4′∆.
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Proof. We will lengthen the proof inductively by adding formulas !F i after
the i-th non-conclusion formula F of the proof. We also only check the
necessitation case. If the k-th non-conclusion formula !F i is derived from
the i-th formula F , we add formulas !F i → !(!F i)k and !(!F i)k, where
the former is an axiom since k > i. Then the resulting sequence will be a
proof in S4′∆. .
The merit of the structural method over the inductive method is the com-
plexity (this can be seen from the number labels). However, the strucutral
method is not alwarys applicable when we consider to extend the realization
procedure to other nomal modal logics, especially to those without the tran-
sitivity A2 axiom. Instead, the LP-style counterparts of these logics have the
following strong axiom necessitation rule: “R2∗ % c :F for c ∈ C, if % F and
F is an axiom or is inferable using R2∗”. The ∆-style counterpart of this
R2∗ rule is not difficult to figure out. With this rule, the inductive method
will still work, where only A2 axiom !Ai → !(!Ai)j of axiom A is used.
4.3 From S4′∆ to S4′′∆
Now from a cut-free S4 proof, we can produce an S4′∆ proof, which is also
an S4′′∆ proof, whose proof realization will be an ELP proof. We need some
more work to produce a stable S4′′∆ proofs whose realization are exactly LP
proofs. We first show that the realization of a stable proof is an LP proof,
and provide an algorithm to produce one from a given S4′′∆ proof.
Recall that if we say a formula in L∆ is, for example, A1-stable, then it
cannot be an A2-, A4-, or R2- formula. To extend this use, we will say, for
a C in {A1, A2, A4, R2 }, a set of m-formulas is C-stable if every element
of the set is so. A set is stable if it is C-stable for some C.
Given an equivalence relation on m-formulas in a S4′′∆ proof, we say a
sequence of equivalence classes E1, E2, . . . is a superchain if for every i there
are m-formulas F ∈ Ei, G ∈ Ei+1 such that F is a predecessor of G.
Definition 4.11. Let S be a set of m-formulas. P∗(S) is the set of all ∗-
predecessors of m-formulas in S for ∗ ∈ {α,β, γ, δ } (see Definition 3.12).
Given a proof in S4′′∆, we say an equivalence relation defined on the proof
is stable if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. every induced equivalence class is stable,
2. for each ∗ ∈ {α,β, γ }, P∗ will be in some equivalence class entirely,
and Pδ is in the union of at most two equivalence classes, entirely.
3. there is no induced circular superchain.
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A proof is stable if we can find a stable equivalence relation on it.
Definition 4.12. Given a stable proof in S4′′∆ via an equivalence relation
∼, a characteristic proof assignment p is stable if it also satisfies equations
p(F, i) = p(G, j) for any !F i ∼ !Gj.
Theorem 4.13. H is a proof in LP if and only if there is a stable proof F in
S4′′∆ and a stable characteristic proof assignment p on F such that H = Fp.
Proof. Suppose F is a stable proof via a stable equivalence relation, the
construction of stable characteristic proof assignment p is just the procedure
in Lemma 3.14, but additionally require that when an m-formula has no
predecessors, we have to assign a term to the m-formula in a way that every
m-formula in the same equivalence class will get the same term. Then it can
be shown that Fp will be an LP proof. For the other direction, just as the
proof in Theorem 3.15 shows, given a proof H in LP, hence a proof in ELP, we
will have an S4′′∆ proof Hη and a proof assignment p such that (Hη)p = H.
Then the equivalence relation on m-formulas in Hη such that !F i ∼ !Gj if
and only if i = j will be stable. Hence Hη is a stable proof. .
One observation is that in an S4′′∆ proof if we enlarge all numbers larger
than a fix number by a fix number, then the resulting sequence is still an
S4′′∆ proof. Hence in the following we will suppose the difference between
two consecutive numbers are far enough to fit our need.
Proposition 4.14. Every proof in S4′′∆ can be extended to a stable proof.
Proof. The purpose of this algorithm is to repeatedly use S4′′∆A4 axioms
to stablize every m-formula such that every A1-formula has at most one
predecessor pair, every A2-formula has at most one γ-predecessor, and every
A4-formula has at most two δ-predecessors, and for these formulas, there are
no predecessors other than the ones described. Then the identity relation
on m-formulas in the resulting proof is a stable equivalence relation. Now
suppose, say, there are A1 axioms φ1 ≡ !(F → G)i → !F j → !Gk, and
φ2 ≡ !(H → G)m → !Hn → !Gk in a proof, then !Gk is an A1-formula with
two predecessor pairs. We add axioms !Gx → !Gk, !Gy → !Gk, !(F →
G)i → !F j → !Gx, !(F → G)i → !F j → !Gy to the proof, where !Gx and
!Gy are new, such that φ1 and φ2 become derived formulas. Also sometimes
φ1 will be applied by axiom necessitation to have formula !φi1. Then we add
more formulas including !(!Gx → !Gk)0, !(!(F → G)i → !F j → !Gx)0 to
have !φi1 derived. Repeat steps of this kind till we have a stable proof. .
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Now the overall procedure, starting from an S4G− proof of an S4 theo-
rem, of our algorithm for the realization theorem can be concluded as:
S4G− ↪→
4.4
S4∆G− ↪→
4.5
S4∆ ↪→
4.10
S4′∆ ↪→
4.14
(S4′′∆)∗ ↪→
3.15
LP,
where each logic name stands for its proofs, hookarrows mean proof trans-
formations, the number under every arrow is the proposition or theorem
where you can find the algorithm, and (S4′′∆)∗ denotes stable proofs in the
logic.
Theorem 4.15. A formula φ ∈ L! is an S4 theorem if and only if there is
a realization r such that φr is an LP theorem.
In Brezhnev and Kuznets [7], it is proved that the original realization
procedure in [2] creates a proof of size exponential to the size of initial cut-
free S4. They improved the procedure to have a polynomial algorithm. Our
procedure, though including several steps, should also be polynomial, if we
use the structural method to convert an S4∆ proof to an S4′∆ proof, since
the original procedure in [2] spiritually adopted the inductive method by
repeating the lifting lemma3.
5 Discussions
One of the consequences of this paper is that LP-style logics, as well as ∆-
style logics, can be taken as instruments for studies on the structure of modal
logic proofs, especially non-circular proofs, which are detemined by LP-style
logics. We have shown that through the theorem realzation procedure every
S4 theorem has a non-circular proof suggested by LP, and this procedure can
be easily generalized as a way to prove that every theorem in a modal logic
with a cut-free Gentzen proof system can be realized to a theorem in a given
LP-counterpart of the logic, and the realizability of theorems immediately
leads to the completeness of non-circular proofs, i.e. every theorem has a
non-circular proof suggested by the given LP-style logic. To gereralize the
procedure, all we need to do is provide a ∆-style cut-free Gentzen system
with adequate ∆-modal rules corresponding to the LP-counterpart given for
the modal logic. Below we take GL and S5 as examples.
Here we consider three versions of LP-style of GL at once. Each is LP
with the A3 axiom t :F → F being replaced by one of the following LP-style
3Lifting Lemma [2, Lemma 5.4] for LP: if s1 :F1, . . . , sn :Fn ' G then there is a proof
term t such that s1 :F1, . . . , sn :Fn ' t :G.
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Lo¨b axioms: s : (t :F → F ) → u :F , with u = ∗s, ∗t, or s ∗ t for a functional
symbol ∗. The ∆-style counterparts of these LP-style Lo¨b axioms would
be !(!F j → F )i → !F k, where k > f (i, j), for f (i, j) = i, j, or max(i, j),
respectively. The ∆-modal rule of the cut-free Gentzen system for these GL∆
logics are
!Γι,Γ,!Aj =⇒ A
!Γι =⇒ !Ak ,
for any k > f (k′, j) with k′ = max(ι)+2|Γ|+1. The soundness of these rules
with respect to their corresponding GL∆ logics shows that every GL theorem
can be realized to a GL∆ theorem and, by our proof realization algorithm, to
a theorem in the corresponding LP-style GL logic. These imply that every GL
theorem has a non-circular proof of the type determined by these LP-style
GL logics.
The peculiarity of Fitting’s cut-free Gentzen system for S5 is that in
order to justify the theoremhood of a formula φ, one should establish a
proof of ⇒ !φ instead of ⇒ φ. But this makes no problem for us.4 One of
the LP-style 5 axiom is taken to be ¬t :F →?t : t :F in the literature5, and its
∆-counterpart is ¬!F i → !(¬!F i)j , j > i. Here’s the right ∆-modal rule
(there is no numerical conditions for the left ∆-modal rule), where multisets
Γ′ = {C ′i} and ι′ = {j′i}:
!Γι ⇒ !Γ′ι′ , A
!Γι ⇒ !Γ′ι′′ ,!Ak ,
for any k > max(ι, ι′) + (|Γ|+ |Γ′|) + 1, and for any j′′i ∈ ι′′, j′′i ≥ j′i. Notice
that the principal label of the positive m-formula !Ak relies on principal
labels of other positve m-formulas.
Some LP-style counterparts of normal modal logics such as K, D, K4, D4,
and KD4 have been introduced in the literature6. Our procedure can also
be adapted to give another algorithmic proof of the realization theorem for
these logics.
One thing to be noticed is that not all types of non-circular proofs
are complete. Theoretically, there should be more incomplete sets of non-
circular proofs than complete ones. But what is interesting is that those
determined by the natural stamps, or to say the natural LP-style logics, like
what we have just mentioned, are all complete. This makes us wonder what
common factors they share. One guess would be that the stamp collects
only direct edges from negative m-formulas to positive ones. But this is not
the case. The LP-style 5 axiom that we have here is a counterexample. Thus
4Fitting [9] also gave an alogrithmic proof of the realization theorem for S5 based on
this cut-free Gentzen system.
5See [16], and [17]
6See [5] and [6]
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the problem remains open.
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